

蔡元培著譯書籍解題

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近代中國著名教育家、思想家蔡元培（1868—1940），是出身舊學而又致力於新學的典型代表，其學問以哲學為根底，其影響則及於二十世紀新文化的整體發展。他所編選、著述和翻譯的書籍，主要有以下十種：

【1】蔡元培：《學堂教科論》，上海：普通學書室，1901年（光緒二十七年）。

1900年至1901年間，蔡元培在紹興和上海搜集國內外參考資料，撰成此書，由杜亞泉主持的普通書學社（地址在上海五馬路）石印出版。封面除書名外，有“蔡元培氏之新著作”及“亞泉書齋”字樣。此書對各級學校的課程進行研究，並分析清代學風敗壞的原因，雖然只有二十八，但已開新世紀教育的先聲。全書內容，收入中國蔡元培研究會編《蔡元培全集》第一卷（杭州：浙江教育出版社，1997年）。

【2】蔡元培編選《文變》，線裝本二冊，上海：商務印書館代印，1902年（光緒二十八年）。

本書分為卷上、卷中上、卷中下、卷下四部份，共收文章四十三篇。蔡元培在〈序〉中引先儒“文以載道”之言，指出“道不變也，而見道之識，隨世界之進化而屢變，則載道之言，與夫載道之言之法，皆不得不隨之而變。……方今科舉易八股為策論，鄉曲士流，皆將抱古文選本為簡練揣摩之計。前者之弊，復何異八股乎？”因此“掣當世名士著譯之文，匯為一冊”，計有：梁啟超（任公）〈飲冰室自由書·無名之英雄〉、〈十種德性相反相成義〉、〈國家思想變遷異同論〉、〈支那人之特質〉、〈記江西女士〉，嚴復〈闢韓〉，蔣智由（觀雲）〈風俗篇〉，杜亞泉〈中國士流改進策〉，高鳳謙（夢旦）〈論拜跪之禮不可行於今日〉；及日本人深山虎太郎〈養士論〉，山根虎侯〈論空言無補於時局〉，石川半山〈論種界之競爭〉，竹越與三郎〈中國人種侵略世界〉等。

至於“先哲所作，於新義無忤者，亦間錄焉”，如黃宗羲〈原君〉、〈原臣〉，俞正燮〈妒非女人惡德論〉、〈節婦說〉等皆是。此外，不著撰人、闕名及使用筆名的文章，約佔全書半數左右。大抵文章都與世變有關，舉凡國家民族、思想風俗、中外文化以至男女婚姻諸問題均有論及，用意是要使“讀者尋其義而知世界風會之所趨，玩其文而知有曲折如意應變無方之效用，以無為三家村夫子之頭巾氣所範圍。”這在當時的文學選本中，是富有新意的。此書的〈序〉及目錄，收入《蔡元培全集》第一卷。

【3】〔德國〕科培爾講述，〔日本〕下田次郎筆錄，蔡元培譯《哲學要領》，上海：商務印書館，1903年（光緒二十九年）。

此書是德國科培爾（Coppet）在日本文科大學講課的內容，由下田次郎筆錄。蔡元培據日文譯出，他在〈序〉中說：“德國科培爾氏任日本文科大學教授之職，約舉哲學之總念及類別及方法及系統以告學者，皆以最近哲學大家康德、黑智爾、哈爾妥門諸家之言為基本，非特唯物、惟心兩派之折衷而已。其所言神秘狀態，實有見於哲學、宗教同源之故。而於古代哲學，提要鉤元，又足示學者研究之法，誠斯學之門徑書也。”

此書除〈緒言〉外，分為四章：（一）哲學之觀念；（二）哲學之類別；（三）哲學之方法；（四）哲學之系統；書末附〈中西人名表〉。這是蔡元培編譯的第一本哲學著作，在中國也是哲學教科書的先驅。但據蔡元培口述、黃世暉筆錄〈蔡子民先生傳略〉所載，此書譯於“蘇報案”前後居留青島期間，“其時無參考書，又心緒不甚寧，所譯人名多詰屈。而一時筆誤，竟以空間為宙，時間為宇。常欲於再版時修正之。”（見新潮社編《蔡子民先生言行錄》，北京：北京大學出版社，1920年）此書於1918年印行第七版，全書收入《蔡元培全集》第九卷。

【4】〔日本〕井上圓了著，蔡元培譯《妖怪學講義·總論》，上海：商務印書館，1906年（光緒三十二年）。

井上圓了《妖怪學講義》一書，原有八冊，總論以下，還有理學部門、醫學部門、純正哲學部門、心理學部門、宗教學部門、教育學部門及雜部門。蔡元培已譯出六冊，售稿於亞泉學館，並先將《總論》付印，但因學館失火，其餘譯稿均遭焚毀，《總論》改由商務印書館出版。

此書《總論》內容如下：第一講〈定義篇〉，第二講〈學科篇〉，第三講〈關係篇〉，第四講〈種類篇〉，第五講〈歷史篇〉，第六講〈原因篇〉，第七至九講〈說明篇〉，第十至十二講〈說明篇〉（變式的心理學總論及各論）。這是一部破除迷信的大著，蔡元培在這方面受其影響頗大。孫東蓀在《文哲月刊》的〈發刊詞〉（1935年，北平）中指出，蔡元培把這部“代表日本人初期接受西洋哲學的態度與反應”的書籍介紹到中國來，反映了當時中國人對哲學的態度，“乃是西方哲學初到東方來的應有的現象。”此書於1922年印行第八版，全書收入《蔡元培全集》第九卷。

【5】〔德國〕泡爾生（F. Paulsen）著，蔡元培譯《倫理學原理》，上海：商務印書館，1909年（宣統元年）初版，1910年（宣統二年）改版重印。

此書據日人蟹江義丸的日文譯本重譯，章節略與原書不同。蔡元培在〈改正倫理學原理序〉中指出：“蟹江氏之譯此書也，曰取其能調和動機論、功利論兩派之學說，而論議平實，不滋流弊也。今之重譯，猶是意也。”本書除〈序論〉外，〈本論〉分為九章：（一）善惡正鵠論與形式論之見解；（二）至善快樂論與勢力論之見解；（三）厭世主義；（四）害及惡；（五）義務及良心；（六）利己主義及利他主義；（七）道德及幸福；（八）道德與宗教之關係；（九）意志之自由；書末附〈西洋倫理學家小傳〉。

據蔡元培口述、黃世暉筆錄〈蔡子民先生傳略〉，蔡元培曾替麥鼎華所編《中等倫理學》撰序，謂“四書五經不合教育體裁”，為張之洞所見，既不滿麥書，而謂蔡序尤其謬妄。商務印書館恐所出之書如署蔡元培著譯，或為清廷所反對，商請改用筆名，故《倫理學原理》、《中國倫理學史》、《中學修身教科書》等初版時，皆假其夫人黃世振（仲玉）之名，署名蔡振。（見《蔡子民先生言行錄》）此書出版後，翌年改版重印，至1921年印行第六版，全書收入《蔡元培全集》第九卷。

【6】蔡元培著《中國倫理學史》，上海：商務印書館，1910年（宣統二年）。

此書以日本學者的著述為主要參考材料，而用西洋形式和理論來敘述中國固有的思想，是蔡元培在學術方面的代表作，也是國人研究中國倫理學史的第一本著作。〈緒論〉對此有明白的交代，說：“日本木村鷹太郎氏，述東洋倫理學史，始以西洋學術史之規則，整理吾國倫理學說……其後又有久保得二氏，述東洋倫理史要，則考證較詳，評斷較慎。”中國向來沒有倫理學史，因此“以木村、久保二氏之作為本。”

書中把中國倫理學史分為先秦創始時代、漢唐繼承時代和宋明理學時代，而將三個時期的各家學說分別論列，認為中國的倫理學說以先秦為極盛，自漢以後，雖然思想家輩出，但其大旨不能出儒家的範圍。而於清儒中，特揭黃宗羲、戴震、俞正燮三家學說作為附錄，強調“已漸脫有宋以來理學之羈絆，是殆為自由思想之先聲。”換言之，他們的言論與清末的民權、女權主張是相合的。戴、黃二氏前人已有所注意，俞氏學說則是蔡元培首先提出來的。1937年間，商務印書館將此書列入“中國文化史叢書”第二輯，重新排印出版。全書收入《蔡元培全集》第一卷。日文版由中島太郎譯出，題作《支那倫理學史》（東京：大東出版社，1941年）。

【7】 蔡元培編著《中學修身教科書》，上海：商務印書館，1912年。

本書分為二篇：上篇注重實踐；下篇注重理論。〈例言〉指出“修身以實踐為要，故上篇較詳。”又說：“教授修身之法，不可徒令生徒依書誦習，亦不可但由教員依書講解，應就實際上之種種方面，以闡發其旨趣；或采歷史故實，或就近來時事，旁徵曲引，以起發學生之心意。”

上篇有修己、家族、社會、國家、職業五章，下篇有緒論、良心論、理想論、本務論、德論、結論六章，內容“悉本我國古聖賢道德之原理，旁及東西倫理學大家之說，斟酌取舍，以求適合於今日之社會。立說務期可行，行文務期明亮。”

此書寫於1911年辛亥革命爆發之前，初版署蔡振編著。1921年出第十六版，應是蔡元培著作中最暢銷的一種。蔡氏曾取一本作若干修改，全書收入《蔡元培全集》第二卷。最近有人把《中學修身教科書》與蔡氏同類型的著作《華工學校講義》（收錄在《蔡子民先生言行錄》中）合編為《國民修養二種》（上海：上海文藝出版社，1999年），足見此書仍有其時代意義。

【8】 蔡元培編譯《哲學大綱》，上海：商務印書館，1915年。

此書以德國厲希脫爾（Richter）的《哲學導言》為本，兼採泡爾生（Paulsen）及馮德（Wunde）的《哲學入門》作為補充，亦有取自他書，及參以己意者。〈凡例〉指出：“本書既為引人研究哲學之作，非哲學之著述，故歷舉各派之說，不多下十成斷語，留讀者自由思考之餘地。”

此書分為四編：第一編〈通論〉闡明哲學之定義、哲學與科學、哲學與宗教、哲學之部類及研究哲學之次第；第二編〈認識論〉介紹認識之概念、主觀之認識、實現世界之認識、本體世界之認識及認識之程度；第三編〈本體論〉分析本體通論、世界全體之實在及性質；第四編〈價值論〉探討價值通論、道德、宗教思想及美學觀念。出版後甚暢銷，至1931年已出第十一版。全書收入《蔡元培全集》第二卷。

【9】 蔡元培著《石頭記索隱》，上海：商務印書館，1915年。

此書原載《小說月報》第七卷第一至六期，商務印書館曾印行多版。此書出版後，一度引起《紅樓夢》的考證熱潮，成為“紅學家”討論的話題。全書收入《蔡元培全集》第三卷，當中有第六版自序〈對於胡適之先生《紅樓夢考證》之商榷〉。

【10】 蔡元培著《簡易哲學綱要》，上海：商務印書館，1924年。

此書是蔡元培旅歐期間應商務印書館之約而編著的，列為“現代師範教科書”之一。全書共分五編：第一編〈緒論〉，討論哲學的定義、哲學的沿革、哲學的部類及哲學綱要的範圍；第二編〈認識問題〉，闡述認識的起源、認識的適當和認識的對象；第三編〈原理問題〉，分述實在論和生成論；第四編〈價值問題〉，探討價值、倫理、美感；第五編〈結論〉，末附〈譯名檢對表〉。全書收入《蔡元培全集》第五卷。

蔡元培所撰文章、演講詞、序跋等的結集，在他生前已有幾種出版，最重要的一種，是新潮社編《蔡子民先生言行錄》二冊（北京：北京大學出版部，1920年；上海：上海書店重印本，1990年）。蔡元培去世後，其全集的編集和印行共有三次：首先是孫常煒編《蔡元培先生全集》（台北：台灣商務印書館，1968年），基本上奠定了全集的基礎；其後高平叔編《蔡元培全集》七卷（北京：中華書局，1984—1989年），作了不少補充；最近，中國蔡元培研究會編《蔡元培全集》十八卷（杭州：浙江教育出版社，1997—2000年），篇幅較前大增，收錄最為豐富。可惜蔡元培晚年的一些手稿，還未見完整地披露出來；若干零星的文章，坊間書刊亦間有發現。將來如果能夠續出一、兩冊補編，就是名副其實的《蔡元培全集》了。

《香港中國近代史學會會刊》 第一至十期要目

香港中國近代史學會成立於1985年，是香港地區一群從事中國近代史研究的學者所發起，會員包括香港各大專院校的史學工作者和研究生，亦有部份會員來自中國內地、台灣、日本、澳洲、美國、加拿大等地。該會的主要活動，除舉辦學術活動、聯絡各地學者外，亦致力於編印學術專著，其中一項重大的工作是出版《香港中國近代史學會會刊》。自1987年創刊以來，每隔一年或兩年出版一期，至1999年間，總共有十期。以下是各期的主要內容：

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Chinese Communism and Dual Revolutionary Strategy (Research Notes) Joseph K. S. Yick

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(香港浸會大學歷史系資料室)

【學界消息】

「二十世紀中國之再詮譯」國際研討會

由香港浸會大學歷史系、北美二十世紀中華史學會、香港中國近代史學會聯合主辦，香港教育學院社會科學系協辦的「二十世紀中國之再詮譯」國際研討會於2001年6月7日至9日在浸會大學林護國際會議中心舉行。出席學者近百人，分別來自美國、加拿大、歐洲、澳洲、俄羅斯、日本、中國內地、台灣及香港多個國家和地區，發表論文七十多篇。中文論文計有：

(1) 知識分子與近代學術發展

- 林平漢，福建師範大學：〈嚴復談科學方法〉
張延榕，福建師範大學：〈嚴復對教育革新的倡導及其實踐〉
林啟彥，香港浸會大學：〈第一次世界大戰期間嚴復的國際政治觀〉
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(2) 中日戰爭（1937-45）

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李木妙，香港新亞研究所：〈戰時民營工業西遷——以榮氏企業為研究案例〉
劉衛東，山東聊城師範學院：〈抗戰時期中國大後方冶金工業發展之研究〉
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(3) 本地史

- 吳志華，香港歷史博物館：〈二十世紀初香港的內部保安〉
周佳榮，香港浸會大學：〈日本人在香港的報業活動〉
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李金強，香港浸會大學：〈二十世紀華人教牧的崛興：兩廣名牧劉粵聲（1892-1960）的生平與事功〉

(4) 近代經濟與商業發展

- 劉慧宇，福建師範大學：〈國民政府中央銀行宏觀調控論〉
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(5) 師範教育

- 王建軍，廣州華南師範大學：〈從師範教育到教師專業化培訓：二十世紀中國師資培訓的反思〉
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(6) 民間組織與活動、政治刊物

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(7) 知識分子與近代學術發展

- 黃嫣梨，香港浸會大學：〈二十世紀一位中國典範式的史學家——論陳寅恪的治學精神〉

區志堅，香港城市大學：〈二十世紀中國學術專業化的建立——以竺可楨與地理學及氣象學的開展為例〉

(8) 當代中國

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楊卓林，廣州暨南大學：〈美國的影響與中國八十年代的文化思潮〉

(9) 歷史問題之再探

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(5) Intellectuals and the Development of Modern Learning

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Ricardo K. S. Mak, Hong Kong Baptist University, “Dao, Science and Yan Fu”

Wong Cheuk Kwan, Zhongshan University, "The Influence of Dewey's Lectures in China on Hu Shi, 1919-1922"

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(6) Health Concerns in Modern China

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Yip Ka-che, University of Maryland - Baltimore County, "Refugee Relief and Social Welfare in Wartime China, 1937-1945"

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(7) The Case of Collaborators

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(9) Modern Chinese Business and Economy

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【Research Notes】

The Business Concerns, Hong Kong, and Sino-American Relations

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Hong Kong was seldom a matter of concern for the United States. Indeed, the once British colony only recently caught world attention with its reversion to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. Otherwise, it was famous for its international port facilities, finance and service sectors, streets of shops, food, and efficiency. Until the late 1970s, few questioned the outmoded colonial status of Hong Kong. As long as it continued to prosper and enjoy certain basic freedoms, it was able to maintain its precarious position. Even when its future was in question, the subject reflected solely the anxieties of the British, who took the initiative in asking about the imminent expiration of the 1997 lease. Hong Kong consists of the Hong Kong Island, the Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories. The British obtained the island and the peninsula through the 1842 Nanjing Treaty and the 1860 Beijing Convention respectively. As for the New Territories, they secured the right to administer in accordance with a ninety-nine-year lease, which ended in 1997. The British first raised the issue of Hong Kong's post-1997 status to Beijing in 1979. The following years witnessed the Sino-British negotiations, and finally the signing of the 1984 Joint Declaration, which stated the return of Hong Kong to China. During the transition from 1984 to 1997, Hong Kong prepared itself for the historic handover. It experienced a democratization process that was unprecedented in its history. London and Beijing also met to discuss its future constitution, new airport, and other important matters. In the course, Hong Kong aroused the interest of the United States, as it became a subject of congressional hearings. In the middle of the transition, Congress passed an act "to set forth the policy of the United States with respect to Hong Kong, and for other purposes."¹ The short title was the "United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992."

This article examines the essence of America's Hong Kong policy in the 1990s, which lay in the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. In order to do so, it analyzes the contents of the Act, the background, the reactions, and the aftermath. It argues that there were similarities between the Act and the two Open Door Notes (1899-1900), in terms of their motives and ultimate objectives. While the Act appeared almost a century after the Open Door Notes, the United States on both occasions reacted to the same concerns. In the 1890s, as well as in the 1990s, the country aimed to promote America's economic interests in East Asia, and to compete with other governments. In 1992, the United States was well aware of the booming China market, the economic opportunities in Asia, and the role of Hong Kong as a communication center in the region. A British colony, Hong Kong enjoyed many trading benefits with the United States. Nevertheless, its return to China posed the danger of Hong Kong losing its advantages in the bilateral relationship with the United States. The continuation of its favorable status was a prerequisite of protecting America's Asian

enterprises. The preservation of the status quo became the motive in outlining the Hong Kong policy of the United States. Thus, the development of American interests was the fundamental objective of the 1992 Act. This was not unlike the fear of losing out in the China scramble in the late nineteenth century that drove Washington to draft and promote the Open Door Notes. In the 1890s, Americans just began to recognize the importance of the China market. In the 1990s, they already became the vested interests.

Economic considerations explained the appearance of both the Act and the Notes, and dictated the manner of execution of the policies. Nevertheless, political rhetoric characterized their pronouncement. In the 1990s, the United States stated that it respected the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which guaranteed the future of Hong Kong. At the same time, it raised the concerns for the maintenance of the freedoms of Hong Kong, the local human rights situation, and the progress of democratization. A century ago, the Open Door Notes upheld the Chinese political, administrative and territorial integrity. Washington circulated the Notes among nations, which were willing to endorse the statement of American position. Nevertheless, the United States would not back up its policy by force. For half a century, the Notes remained a mere assertion of grand principles. Nations paid lip service to the American documents, but acted differently most of the time. The United States made a declaration of fair competition in China. Nevertheless, it did not have the will or the power to implement its policy. In the 1990s, circumstances were different. The British took the lead in raising the concern for Hong Kong's political future. In this case, the United States did not assume a leading role. Instead, it was an observer, and was willing to uphold the Sino-British Joint Declaration. The political stability of Hong Kong became the formal obligations of the London and Beijing governments. While the 1992 Act acknowledged the special status of Hong Kong after 1997, this was also the objective of the Joint Declaration. As a bystander who recently took interest in the Hong Kong issue, the United States enjoyed flexibility in its actions. While the Open Door policy was doomed to failure, the Act outlined a realistic position. This article will conclude with the following observation. While the United States had little liability in Hong Kong matters, this fact actually accounted for its favorable position. It should refrain from unattainable goals, as in the days of the Open Door policy. In addition, it should beware of the dangers of political rhetoric.

The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992

The Act recognized an established fact, namely the existence of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration. At its very beginning, the Act acknowledged the Joint Declaration and the decision of the Chinese re-exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997.² As a special administrative region thereafter, the United States understood that Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree of autonomy except in areas of defense and foreign relations. Under the policy of "one country, two systems," the local social, economic, legal structures would continue at least for fifty years. At the same time, the United States believed that the Joint Declaration had promised democracy and basic liberties. Section 2 states: "The legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be constituted by elections, and the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as applied to Hong Kong, shall remain in force."³ On such basis, the United States supported the implementation of the Joint Declaration.

The Act revealed the three concerns of the United States. They were, in the descending order, economic factors, democratization, and human rights. Hong Kong had established a position in the regional economy, and its economic relations with the United States. Thus, its stability and prosperity were of vital American interest. Having mentioned this, however, the Act stated that the "support for democratization" had been essential to American foreign policy. Rhetorical was the assertion that such principle was also applicable to the Hong Kong situation. So was saying that the human rights of the local population were "of great importance to the United States."⁴

Despite the proclamation of political ideals, the Act outlined "the policy of the United States," which expressed exclusively economic considerations. The United States was concerned about its relations with Hong Kong. It sought to maintain the existing ties and agreements with the latter in areas of economics, trade, finance, monetary relations, and the aviation, shipping, communications and tourist industries. At the same time, it continued to encourage the activities of official and semi-official Hong Kong institutions in the United States. They included the Hong Kong Economic & Trade Office, the Office of the Hong Kong Trade Development Council, and the Hong Kong Tourist Association. In the international arena, the United States welcomed the continued participation of Hong Kong in "multilateral conferences, agreements, and

organizations.”It supported Hong Kong as “a separate customs territory,” and a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In other words, the United States expected the continuation of Hong Kong’s existing status after the handover.⁵

Moreover, the United States was eager to expand its commercial and trade relations with Hong Kong.It regarded the latter as “a separate territory in economic and trade matters, such as import quotas and certificates of origin.”⁶Such status would continue after June 30, 1997.The Act aimed to facilitate America’s relations with Hong Kong by acknowledging the special status of the latter after the Chinese takeover.The following quotation stated the fundamental objective.The Act wrote: “The United States should continue to treat Hong Kong as a territory which is fully autonomous from the United Kingdom and, after June 30, 1997, should treat Hong Kong as a territory which is *fully autonomous from the People’s Republic of China with respect to economic and trade matters.*”⁷After the handover, Hong Kong still enjoyed the “most-favored-nation status” in selling products to the United States.In addition, Hong Kong continued to have access to “sensitive technologies” under the management of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM).⁸According to the United States, the recovery of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong would not affect the existing commercial and trading relationship.

The Act was a declaration of America’s intention to preserve the status quo of Hong Kong.It stated that American laws applicable to Hong Kong remained effective after June 30, 1997.So were the international agreements between the United States and Hong Kong, and were those between the United States and the United Kingdom and applied to Hong Kong.⁹ Only when the President considered Hong Kong “not sufficiently autonomous to justify treatment under a particular law of the United States” would he issue an executive order, and suspend the application of that law to the territory.¹⁰

The Background to the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992

1. The Senate Subcommittee Hearing of April 2, 1992

In 1992, the Senate and the House of Representatives held a number of hearings before the passing of the Act.In April, the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, discussed about Hong Kong matters.The Subcommittee explained its objective as to examine “the subject of Hong Kong’s reversion to China and the implications that means for American policy.”¹¹It intended to review the existing situation of the territory, and to outline the expectations for the future.At the beginning, the Subcommittee recognized the impressive economic performance of Hong Kong and the local democratization progress.The hearing was “historic,” as the Subcommittee for the first time talked about “U.S. policy toward Hong Kong as a separate and distinct issue.”¹²Previously, it had only considered Hong Kong in the light of Sino-American relations.The hearing then represented a break from the past.In addition, the hearing was “timely,” as American interests in the territory had developed to an extent that the bilateral relationship required close attention.

The growing importance of the Hong Kong issue reflected the concern that American interests should stay intact after the handover.According to the Subcommittee, the spirit of the Act was that Hong Kong’s status in United States law would not change as a result of the Chinese takeover.The Act received the support of twenty senators and “a broad coalition of business organizations, editorial boards, human rights groups, cultural and educational exchange associations, and policy think-tanks.”¹³The objective was to ensure that the handover would not affect the bilateral ties between the United States and Hong Kong.

Richard Solomon, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, made a statement.He was a renowned Sinologist, and had a more in-depth knowledge of the Hong Kong situation.In terms of both economic development and political reform, he was hopeful of the territory.According to him, local confidence had recovered after the June 4 Incident of 1989.His optimism reflected another end of the spectrum, totally opposite to worries that Hong Kong would subject to the totalitarian rule of a Communist regime.“Signs of prosperity are everywhere,” he said, “Hong Kong seems to be entering a new cycle of growth.”¹⁴Moreover, he was satisfied with the human rights condition.Hong Kong had just passed the bill of rights, and was considering the suitability of local laws.Solomon pointed out that the Hong Kong legislature for the first time accepted a number of elected seats in September 1991.

More importantly, Solomon alerted to the fact that Hong Kong was important to the modernization of China. According to him, “Hong Kong’s post-1997 fate will be a measure of China’s own reform efforts, and of its relationship to the international economic and political system.”¹⁵ He emphasized the integration of the economies of Hong Kong and South China. Here, Solomon shared the excitement of China watchers, who looked favorably toward the future of this region. China attained outstanding achievements in its reform, and continued to benefit from the economic relationship with Hong Kong. He stated: “The economic integration of southern China with Hong Kong has been key to the remarkable success of the special economic zones adjacent to Hong Kong, and the Pearl River delta.”¹⁶ Hong Kong was the center of the region, and took the lead in the economic advancement of the country as a whole. According to Solomon, “South China today is the most dynamic region of economic growth within the PRC [People’s Republic of China], and Hong Kong is clearly the engine of that growth.”¹⁷ The development of Hong Kong affected that of the southern provinces, and the modernization of China. Thus, the prosperity of Hong Kong was the source of confidence for China. Solomon pointed to Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Guangdong and Shenzhen in January 1992, as “an endorsement” of the reform progress of the region. The economic growth of Hong Kong provided guarantees for the future of the territory.

At the same time, Solomon reminded the Subcommittee of America’s interests in Hong Kong. According to him, the United States invested more than \$7 billion in Hong Kong, and involved more than \$17 billion in trade with the latter. There were more than 900 American firms and more than 21,000 Americans in Hong Kong.¹⁸ The United States was then Hong Kong’s largest market, while the latter was America’s fourteenth most important trade companion. Here, Solomon provided the figures. American exports to Hong Kong were worth \$8.1 billion, and American imports from the territory totaled \$9.3 billion in 1991. As he stated, “each Hong Kong resident bought a staggering \$1,300 worth of U.S. products last year.”¹⁹ In addition, American firms were competing for projects of the new airport and container terminal in Hong Kong. The American stake was huge, Solomon said, and so was the possible contribution of the United States to the future of Hong Kong.

It was in such context that Solomon supported “revising U.S. law to ensure that U.S. legal requirements enable the United States to continue to interact with Hong Kong after it becomes a special administrative region of the PRC in 1997.”²⁰ While Solomon spoke from his point of view, he actually revealed the spirit of the Act. In 1992, this was the reason for formulating an American policy toward Hong Kong. Since the United States had established a foothold in the territory, Americans were concerned that they could continue and expand their interests in post-1997 Hong Kong. If the United States had not decided on a policy in 1992, it would lose Hong Kong as an important trading partner after June 30, 1997. There was a desperate need for the United States to ensure that such scenario would not happen.

The bilateral relationship between the United States and Hong Kong operated on three levels. In the Subcommittee hearing, Solomon explained the situation. The “extensive commercial, cultural, transportation, communication and other relations” were possible because American laws then treated Hong Kong as part of British territory. However, the United States considered Hong Kong in its own right when granting the latter the most-favored-nation status. Occasionally, the United States regarded Hong Kong as “a separate territory” in matters of immigration and textile quotas. In sum, “Hong Kong receives most of the advantages under U.S. law of being part of the United Kingdom, with a few advantageous modifications that give effect to the territory’s economic autonomy and cultural distinctiveness from the U.K.”²¹ This also meant that Hong Kong did not suffer from the “U.S. domestic legal constraints,” which had restricted Sino-American relations in areas of commerce, culture and others. Problem arose after June 30, 1997, as Hong Kong would become part of China. According to Solomon, the statutes “could require the imposition on Hong Kong of restrictions and disabilities that would be inconsistent with” the American intent “to respect Hong Kong’s promised autonomy from the PRC.”²² In stating America’s Hong Kong policy, the Act “establishes clearly the authority of the United States Government to treat Hong Kong, where appropriate, as a non-sovereign entity which is distinct from the PRC for purposes of U.S. domestic law.”²³ It “requires the United States to treat Hong Kong, after 1997, as a separate territory much in the same manner it treats Hong Kong before and on June 30, 1997.”²⁴ Thus, the Act ensured the continuation of the existing bilateral relationship between the United States and Hong Kong. It further provided the basis for the expansion of American interests in the territory.

Americans were concerned about their interests in Hong Kong. At the same time, they were hopeful of the growth of “Greater China,” and the opportunities that arose. In the Subcommittee hearing, David M. Lampton, who was President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, emphasized the “pivotal role” of Hong Kong in the development of the “Greater Chinese economy.”²⁵ He had some observations. Firstly, he believed that Hong Kong had greater influence on China than the latter had on the territory. As he said, Hong Kong enterprises employed three million workers in China, and were “a critical agent of change” in the mainland. Hong Kong companies expanded into South China, and installed rapid changes in the economy and society of the mainland. Secondly, Lampton argued that the interdependency of the mainland and Hong Kong economies ensured “the security” of the territory. “It is hard to imagine that the PRC would intentionally sacrifice rapidly-growing economic interests in Hong Kong,” he said, and “the PRC is already the biggest ‘stockholder’ in Hong Kong.”²⁶ Here, he was responding to the worry that Hong Kong would suffer from political disasters. He continued: “While we cannot exclude the possibility of policies or developments in China that would undermine those interests (e.g. events such as Tiananmen and its aftermath are indeed sobering), the best guarantor of Hong Kong’s future is its strong economic utility to the PRC.”²⁷ Then, Lampton talked about the implications for the United States. He stated: “The third major American interest derives from the first two--namely that Hong Kong is a tremendous platform from which America can develop its economic and cultural ties, not only in ‘Greater China,’ but the East Asian region more broadly. Hong Kong’s infrastructure, strategic location, and cultural ties throughout the region make it an indispensable hub.”²⁸

2. The House Hearings of April 9 and May 7, 1992

2.1. The Joint Hearing of April 9

Between April and May 1992, the House of Representatives subcommittees held two hearings on “U.S. policy toward Hong Kong.” On April 9, the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations, Asian and Pacific Affairs, International Economic Policy and Trade, and International Operations held a joint hearing on America’s Hong Kong policy. They discussed the bill, if passed, the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act.

The record of April 9 included a written statement of William H. Overholt of the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong. Representing the business interests, Overholt welcomed the support of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which enabled the United States to continue its trade with Hong Kong on existing ground. Moreover, he agreed to a declaration of America’s policy toward Hong Kong. The Act, after being passed, set forth rules which recognized Hong Kong travel documents, separate agreements with the territory, and Hong Kong’s memberships in international organizations.²⁹ According to him, they were significant to America’s interests in the territory. He asserted that Hong Kong was “the headquarters of American business in Asia.” The American Chamber of Commerce there was the largest American Chamber of Commerce outside the United States mainland. In addition, the American establishment in Hong Kong provided the basis for the future expansion in Asia. As he said, “Hong Kong is the location of 51% of all multinational corporations’ regional headquarters in Asia, and American firms constitute the largest group of such headquarters. The importance of this for our economic future is magnified by the fact that Asia is the fastest growing part of the world economy, and coastal China is the fastest growing part of Asia.”³⁰ In other words, the Act allowed the United States to capture the enormous opportunities in the rapidly growing Chinese and Asian markets.

The arguments of Overholt found support from Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky. More importantly, the latter pointed out that the United States should be ready to establish an independent policy toward Hong Kong. McConnell mentioned the recent debates on the extension of the most-favored-nation status to China. Hong Kong would not be dependent of the British after June 30, 1997. Since circumstances changed, the United States should make known its intention to continue the existing most-favored-nation privileges of the territory after the handover. Moreover, the remarkable expansion of American interests in Hong Kong was a sufficient reason to justify the making of a separate policy. The Act would “reflect these developments.”³¹ According to him, it was about time “that the U.S.-Hong Kong relationship be considered, and be considered independently of our larger U.S.-China policy.”³² The Act aimed to “lead the international community in support of the autonomy promised Hong Kong under the Joint Declaration.”³³ He

continued: “the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act, begins the process of establishing such a policy by spelling out for the first time a comprehensive, coherent approach to formalizing our relationship with Hong Kong.”³⁴

Representative John Edward Potter of Illinois outlined the problems that would arise if the United States did not establish such policy. He said:

Current law does not protect U.S. interests in Hong Kong. Under current law, Hong Kong and China will be treated simply as one nation after 1997. All laws that apply to China will then apply to Hong Kong. All treaties will treat Hong Kong the same as they do China. Hong Kong will be under China’s immigration and trade quotas. For example, Mr. Chairman, the United States would not recognize Hong Kong passports or visas, as we do know. Dual use of technology could not flow to Hong Kong. I simply cite this example: supercomputers that are used by Hong Kong banks, could no longer be imported into Hong Kong, because, under present law, they cannot be imported into China.³⁵

In addition, he warned of the danger imposed on American enterprises in the territory. He stated: “This would be a U.S. enforcement of one country-one system policy, that is abhorrent to the Joint Declaration and abhorrent to our relationships with Hong Kong. It would kill U.S. business interests. U.S. business in this region is centered in Hong Kong.”³⁶ He continued: “Hong Kong must remain distinct under our law. So we need to change our law to allow the United States to interact with Hong Kong in accordance with the Joint Declaration and to protect our own interests.”³⁷

2.2. *The Joint Hearing of May 7*

In the Joint hearing of May 7, Solomon spoke again. He alerted the audience to the danger of the United States losing out to other nations if it did not establish a policy toward Hong Kong. He said:

After 1997, the world will continue to engage in economic relations with China through Hong Kong. By that time, mainland firms will have had more than 18 years of on-the-job training in how to do business the Hong Kong way. They will use Hong Kong as a base to increase their trade, investment, and financial interchange with the rest of the world just as foreign firms now use Hong Kong as a bridge to China.³⁸

Here, Solomon raised the concern that the United States should play an active role in the vibrant Asian economies. Toward the end of the twentieth century, this was similar to the American determination to engage in the scramble for concessions in China a century ago.

3. *The Markups of S. 1731 of July 22 and August 5, 1992*

3.1. *The Markup of S. 1731 of July 22*

On July 22, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, as well as the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations, Asian and Pacific Affairs, and International Economic Policy and Trade, met to consider the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. The Senate had already approved the Act, then referred to by the House as S. 1731.

According to Representative Stephen J. Solarz, who chaired the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, the United States wanted to achieve certain objectives through the enactment of the Act. Firstly, the Act would state clearly the American position regarding Hong Kong after the handover. Specific policies included those on “government representation, commerce, transportation, and cultural exchanges.”³⁹ Secondly, the Act would solve the problem of the applicability of existing laws to Hong Kong after June 30, 1997. As he said, “the bill constructs a bridge across the 1997 divide, so that, where appropriate, US laws that are currently being applied to Hong Kong may continue to apply after reversion, and international agreements to which the United States and Hong Kong are parties may continue in force.”⁴⁰

Thirdly, the Act would provide assurance that the United States was concerned about the well being of the local population. Solarz stated: "A change in the exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong will in no way sever the family ties and emotional bonds that link the United States and Hong Kong."⁴¹ Of particular emphases were that "the human rights of the people of Hong Kong are protected, and the degree to which they are permitted to govern themselves."⁴² While acknowledging the continuation of the autonomous status of the territory after the reversion to Chinese rule, Solarz stressed that the United States did not have any "hidden agenda." On the one hand, the Act proposed certain American actions. On the other hand, it spelled out what the United States would not do. Most importantly, "it does not seek to split post-1997 Hong Kong from China."⁴³ "The United States accepts the reversion of the territory to Chinese sovereignty," Solarz asserted that to "suggest otherwise is purely paranoia."⁴⁴ Since the United States had long established ties with the local people, the country should indicate specifically and in detail the manner in which such relationship would continue after the handover.

3.2. *The Markup of S. 1731 of August 5*

On August 5, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs met to consider S. 1731, to "establish the policy of the United States with respect to Hong Kong, and for other purposes."⁴⁵ Again, Solarz raised his point: "Let me simply say that we have an enormous interest in the continued well-being of Hong Kong."⁴⁶ American investments totaled over \$7 billion, American firms there numbered 900, and Americans were about 21,000. He continued, "the whole key to the economic future of China lies in Hong Kong, and I believe that this legislation will help to stabilize the situation in Hong Kong."⁴⁷ It would be a source of confidence for the local people. At the same time, it would enable the United States to continue its present relationship with Hong Kong after 1997.

The written testimony of Perry Bechky of the Freedom House to the House Committee on Foreign Relations aptly summarized the arguments so far. A portion of his statement was:

United States-Hong Kong relations . . . do not make headlines--even when they make news at all. Washington generally treats Hong Kong as a footnote to its relations with China. This results from a failure of our policy-makers to appreciate Hong Kong's importance--a fact known quite well by American business. Consider the facts:

bilateral trade with Hong Kong (our eleventh largest trade partner) well exceeds trade with the People's Republic, at over \$25 billion per year;

the average Hong Kong person consumes over \$1,100 worth of American goods annually, one of the highest rates in the world;

a very large portion of all Chinese trade goes through Hong Kong, which operates the busiest port in the world and which is about to expand its capabilities greatly as part of a major infrastructure development plan;

over 900 U.S. companies operate in Hong Kong, including 250 which base their regional headquarters there;

Hong Kong houses over \$7 billion in U.S. investments, and recent surveys indicate that most Americans plan to keep their investments in Hong Kong beyond 1997;

Hong Kong serves as the primary conduit for U.S.-China business relations and promotes the economic, political and social liberalization of southern China; and

Hong Kong features infrastructure, telecommunications, media, a legal system, and an English-speaking population unmatched in the region.⁴⁸

The local media had been discussing about the Act even in 1991. The general impression was that the Act signified an important change in America's position toward Hong Kong. Moreover, the appearance of the Act meant that the Hong Kong issue had become an international concern.⁴⁹ As reported, the press regarded the Act as working to the benefit of American economic interests. By ensuring the autonomous status of Hong Kong after the handover, the Act safeguarded the economic relations between the territory and the United States.

After the passing of the Act, the United States felt more secure in pursuing its interests in the territory. In the hearings in the House and the Senate, the speakers urged to treat Hong Kong as an independent issue, and to have a separate policy toward the territory. While the Act represented the first attempt of the United States to establish its position toward Hong Kong, the congressional debates had actually revealed a larger concern. The consideration was that American interests in the territory were instrumental to the future development of the China market. Thus, the American assertion to handle Hong Kong in its own right was in fact an acknowledgment of the significance of the territory in the Greater China economies. In 1994, a Presidential Business Development Mission went to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hong Kong to explore the trading opportunities. The mission acknowledged the central role of Hong Kong in the modernization effort of the Chinese mainland. The words of President Bill Clinton reflected the importance of Hong Kong to America's interests locally, in China, and in Asia.

As Clinton stated:

It is with great pleasure that I welcome each of the U.S. private sector leaders and distinguished senior government officials joining Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown as members of the Presidential Business Development Mission to China and Hong Kong. Secretary Brown's mission is an important building block in our effort to advance our political, economic, and strategic interests in Asia and the Pacific and to establish lasting commercial relationships with China and Hong Kong. Trade with this strategic region represents both challenges and opportunities for the United States.⁵⁰

Again, the United States emphasized the importance of the China market. The booming Chinese economies seemed to provide American corporations with enormous opportunities. The United States was not going to lose out in this big scramble. As Secretary of Commerce Ronald H. Brown, who headed the expedition, pointed out: "By helping American businesses penetrate one of the world's fastest growing markets, this mission will strengthen the economic bridge between the United States and this increasingly important region."⁵¹ Specifically, he said that the Chinese economic development provided American "growth sectors" with enormous opportunities. They included telecommunications, energy, and transportation. Moreover, he emphasized Hong Kong's contribution to the modernization effort in China. As he said, "China's ambitious modernization plans make it the world's largest market for infrastructure and industrial projects."⁵² According to him, "Hong Kong plays a strategic role as China's economic window to the world."⁵³ More importantly, Brown outlined his policy toward the so-termed "Chinese Economic Area." He stated: "As an important element of our National Export Strategy, the Department of Commerce designated the Chinese Economic Area, which includes China and Hong Kong, as the 'Big Emerging Market' offering the greatest opportunities for expansion of American exports in the next two decades."⁵⁴

The mission included both government representatives and corporate executives. Besides Secretary Brown, West Virginia Governor Gaston Caperton was also present. Within the Department of Commerce, representatives came from the Office of the Secretary. There were other delegates from the International Trade Administration, the Asian Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the National Security Council, the National Economic Council, the United States Information Agency, and the Department of State.⁵⁵ As for representatives from private businesses, they came from twenty-five corporations.

Conclusion

Economic considerations played a significant role in the making of Hong Kong policy. The United States was concerned about the American interests in the territory, the development of the existing enterprises, and the exploitation of upcoming opportunities. The political handover incited the announcement of an *independent* policy toward Hong Kong. Through its declaration, the United States sought to maintain its favorable economic relationship with the territory. The prosperity of Hong Kong concerned not only

American interests there, but also the trade in South China, and in the Greater Chinese economies as a whole. In the 1990s, the United States was not the initiator of a Hong Kong policy. It followed the British lead, and upheld the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Unlike the days of the Open Door, the United States did not need to take up a leadership position. It no longer suffered from political constraints and rhetoric. Realism characterized the Hong Kong policy, independent of the considerations with regard to China. The chance of success (or accomplishment) of the current American policy was higher than the rhetorical Open Door policy a century ago.

- [1.](#) *United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, U.S. Statutes at Large* 106, (1993): 1448-54.
- [2.](#) Ibid.
- [3.](#) Ibid.
- [4.](#) Ibid., 1448-49.
- [5.](#) Ibid., 1449-50.
- [6.](#) *Ibid.*, 1450.
- [7.](#) Ibid., (italics mine)
- [8.](#) Ibid., 1451.
- [9.](#) Ibid., 1452-53.
- [10.](#) *Ibid.*, 1453.
- [11.](#) Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hong Kong's Reversion to China and Implications for U.S. Policy: Hearing before the Subcommittee East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 102b Cong., 2d sess., 2 April 1992, 1.
- [12.](#) Ibid.
- [13.](#) Ibid., 2.
- [14.](#) Ibid., 5.
- [15.](#) Ibid., 5-6.
- [16.](#) Ibid., 6.
- [17.](#) Ibid.
- [18.](#) Ibid., 7 & 11.
- [19.](#) Ibid., 11.
- [20.](#) Ibid., 7.
- [21.](#) Ibid., 12.
- [22.](#) Ibid.
- [23.](#) Ibid.
- [24.](#) Ibid., 15.
- [25.](#) Ibid., 24.
- [26.](#) Ibid.
- [27.](#) Ibid.
- [28.](#) Ibid.
- [29.](#) House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *U.S. Policy toward Hong Kong: Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations, Asian and Pacific Affairs, International Economics Policy and Trade, and International Operations; and the Markups of S. 1731 before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations, Asian and Pacific Affairs, International Economics Policy and Trade*, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 9 April, 7 May, 22 July, 5 August 1992, 4.
- [30.](#) Ibid.
- [31.](#) Ibid., 10.
- [32.](#) Ibid.
- [33.](#) Ibid., 11.
- [34.](#) Ibid.
- [35.](#) Ibid., 18.
- [36.](#) Ibid.
- [37.](#) Ibid.
- [38.](#) Ibid., 83.
- [39.](#) Ibid., 129.
- [40.](#) Ibid.
- [41.](#) Ibid.
- [42.](#) Ibid.
- [43.](#) Ibid.

- [44.](#) Ibid.
- [45.](#) Ibid., 165.
- [46.](#) Ibid., 166.
- [47.](#) Ibid.
- [48.](#) Ibid., 189.
- [49.](#) Ibid.
- [50.](#) A statement of Bill Clinton of August 9, 1994. Read *Presidential Business Development Mission to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hong Kong, 27 August - 3 September 1994*.
- [51.](#) Ronald Brown, "A Message from the Secretary of Commerce," in *Presidential Business Development Mission to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hong Kong, 27 August - 3 September 1994*.
- [52.](#) Ibid.
- [53.](#) Ibid.
- [54.](#) Ibid.
- [55.](#) Presidential Business Development Mission to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Hong Kong, 27 August - 3 September 1994.
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